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CIVIL RIGHTS-MEDICAL MARIJUANA

RECOGNIZED AS FACIALLY REASONABLE
ACCOMMODATION UNDER HANDICAP
DISCRIMINATION CLAIM IN
MASSACHUSETTS-BARBUTO V. ADVANTAGE
SALES AND MKTG., LLC, 78 N.E.3D 40 (MASS. 2017).
Despite being outlawed by federal law, medical marijuana has
gained increasing recognition for its medical benefits, as evidenced by the
consistent rise of state statutes authorizing the use of medical marijuana for
qualifying patients.' Massachusetts has followed this legislative trend, and
in 2012, voters approved the Medical Marijuana Act: An Act for the
Humanitarian Medical Use of Marijuana (the "Act"). 2 The Act states that
"there should be no punishment under state law for qualifying patients ...
for the medical use of marijuana." 3 However, with the adoption of the Act
also comes unanswered questions regarding the best practices to balance

1

See 21 U.S.C. §§ 812(b)(1), (c) (2012) (banning all uses of marijuana, and categorizing it as
schedule I drug); see also Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 2 (2005) (maintaining under federal law
medical marijuana recognized for having no acceptable medical uses).
But see NAT'L
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, State Medical Marijuana Laws, Nat'1 Conf of St.
Legislatures, http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/state-medical-marijuana-laws.aspx (last visited
Mar. 3, 2019) (reporting thirty-three states allow "comprehensive public medical marijuana and
cannabis programs."). The District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and Guam also have such programs.
Id. Additionally, twelve other states allow use of "low THC, high cannabidiol .. . products' for
medical reasons in limited situations or as a legal defense." Id.
2 See An Act for the Humanitarian Medical Use of Marijuana, 2012 MASS. ACTS ch. 369 § 4
(establishing legal protection for medical cannabis patients, caregivers, physicians, medical
professionals, cultivators, and providers). More specifically, the Act allows qualifying patients to
access marijuana for medical purposes by lawful means and eliminates the risk of criminal penalties
that qualifying patients, healthcare providers and suppliers might otherwise face under state law.
Id. The Act defines a qualifying patient as a person who has been "diagnosed by a licensed
physician as having a debilitating medical condition." Id. § 2. The Act lists debilitating medical
conditions that may be treated by medical marijuana. Id. These debilitating medical conditions
may subsequently be considered conditions that could certify an employee as a "qualified handicap
employee" under the Massachusetts General Laws. Id.; see also 105 MASS CODE REGS. §§
725.004-.015 (2017) (implementing Act's legal protections under Department of Public Health
("DPH")).
3 See An Act for the Humanitarian Medical Use of Marijuana, 2012 MASS. ACTS ch. 369 § 4
("qualifying patients shall not be penalized under Massachusetts law in any manner, or denied any
right or privilege, for their medical marijuana use."). On the other hand, the Act can only provide
protections within its scope, and enumerates that the Act "does not provide immunity from
prosecution under Federal law", nor does it "limit the applicability of other law as it pertains to the
rights of. . . employers, law enforcement authorities, or regulatory agencies." Id.
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governing law with the Act.4 Specifically, the Act presents issues in the
employment context and the ways in which employers can respect the
statutory rights given to medical marijuana patients, while also insulating
themselves from liability.' Employer's concerns have arisen from the fact
that the Act does not provide any protection to employers for regulating an
employee's use of medical marijuana, and is silent as to whether employers
have an obligation to accommodate off-site use of the drug under Mass. Gen.
Laws. ch. 151B. 6 In short, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B states that it is
"unlawful practice" for an employer to dismiss an employee from
employment, or refuse to hire any person alleging to be a qualified
handicapped person, because of her handicap when the person is capable of
performing the essential functions of the position involved with reasonable
accommodation, "unless the employer can demonstrate that the
accommodation required to be made to the physical or mental limitations of
the person would impose an undue hardship to the employer's business."'
Essentially, the conflict for the employer lies in the reconciliation between
the Act and Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B. Though the Act states that
employers cannot deny medical marijuana users any "right or privilege," and
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B provides that handicapped employees have a
"right to reasonable accommodation," it does not specifically address how

4 See Barbuto v. Advantage Sales & Mktg., LLC, 2016 WL 8653056, at *2 (Mass. Super. Ct.
2016) aff'd in part, reversed in part 78 N.E.3d 37 (Mass. 2017) (interpreting that state disability
discrimination statutes do not extend to marijuana for medical purposes). In the past, state disability
discrimination statutes have not applied to medical marijuana use because such use remains illegal
under federal law. Id; see also Erica E. Flores, Accommodating Employee Use of Medical
Marijuana,99 MASS. L. REV. 72, 73 (2018) (outlining prior court's history with medical marijuana
protections).
I See Erica E. Flores, AccommodatingEmployee Use ofMedical Marijuana,99 MASS. L. REV.
72, 73 (2018) (providing protections to qualified patients but employers not insulated from civil
liability under Act).
6 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151B §§ 1(16), 4(16) (LexisNexis 2017) (explaining
qualified handicap employee has right not to be fired because of her handicap); see also Barbuto v.
Advantage Sales & Mktg., LLC, 78 N.E.3d 37, 50 (Mass. 2017) (explaining handicap
discrimination claim is established in implied legislative intent). Here, the court stated, "the
drafters of the Act appear to have recognized the existence of a cause of action for handicap
discrimination by specifically prohibiting 'on-site' medical marijuana use as an 'accommodation."'
Id. Thus, the specific language prohibiting "on-site" use led to an implication that "off-site" use
may be allowed. Id.
7 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151B §§ 1(16), 4(16) (LexisNexis 2017) (defining unlawful
practice standard under Massachusetts General laws); see also Godfrey v. Globe Newspaper Co.,
Inc., 928 N.E.2d 327, 333 (Mass. 2010) (quotingCox v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 607 N.E.2d
1035, 1036 (Mass. 1993)) ("Once an employee 'make[s] at least a facial showing that reasonable
accommodation is possible,' the burden of proof [of both production and persuasion] shifts to the
employer to establish that a suggested accommodation would impose an undue hardship.").
Meanwhile, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B was not amended to address the potential impact of the
Medical Marijuana Act in the workplace. § 1(16).

290

JOURNAL OF TRIAL & APPELLATE ADVOCACY [Vol. XXIV

employers should regulate the use of drugs or medication for the employees.I
However, in Barbuto v. Advantage Sales & Mktg., 9 a case of first impression,
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ("SJC") attempted to clarify this
grey area and addressed whether a qualifying patient, terminated from
employment due to testing positive for her medically prescribed marijuana,
has a civil remedy against her employer.'o This decision comes in light of
the passing of the Act, and despite traditional interpretations of Mass. Gen.
Laws. ch. 151B which have supported the idea that employers do not need
to accommodate for medical marijuana." The SJC held that Barbuto was
able to bring a state claim against her employer for both handicap and
qualified handicap discrimination, and perhaps even more importantly held
that Barbuto's use of medical marijuana was facially reasonable as an
accommodation.12
The facts of the case explain that in the summer of 2014, the
plaintiff, Christina Barbuto ("Barbuto"), was prescribed medical marijuana
in compliance with Massachusetts law to treat a gastrointestinal condition,
While legally prescribed the medical
known as Crohn's disease. 3
marijuana. Barbuto accepted a job offer from Advantage Sales and
Marketing, LLC ("ASM").1 4 The position was contingent upon the
satisfactory completion of a pre-employment drug test.15 However, before
taking the drug test and beginning at ASM, Barbuto voluntarily disclosed to
ASM that she used medical marijuana to treat her Crohn's disease." The
supervisor at ASM told Barbuto that her medicinal use of marijuana "should

8

§§1(16), 4(16) (asserting qualified handicap persons also have "rights and privileges" to

reasonable accommodations). The "rights and privileges" include the right not to be fired because
of a handicap. Id
9 78 N.E.3d 40 (Mass. 2017) (establishing standing for qualified patients prescribed medical
marijuana).
10 See Barbuto, 78 N.E.3d at 40 (describing issue at hand).
" See Barbuto, 2016 WL 8653056, at *2 ("[T]here is no support for finding that G. L. c. 151B
requires an employer to accommodate an employee's use of medical marijuana.").
12 See id. at 37 (rejecting "implied right of private action" and "wrongful termination in
violation of public policy" claims). The Court further explained that Barbuto would not necessarily
win on her handicap discrimination claim, just that the claim was reasonable. Id. Furthermore, the
Court affirmed that Barbuto's Crohn's disease is a debilitating medical condition that may be
treated by medical marijuana. Id. at 41.
" See id. (providing factual background of case).
14 See Barbuto, 78 N.E.3d at 41-42 (explaining ASM's recruiter told Barbuto she would start
off entry-level but would advance quickly). Barbuto also brought action against the ASM recruiter
("Villaruz"), individually and in conjunction with ASM. Id. at 41.
'5 See id. at 40 (providing test was mandatory for all employees).
16 See id. at 41 (explaining HR manager later confirmed with Barbuto that medical marijuana
"would not be an issue"). Barbuto also explained that she only used marijuana in small quantities
at her home to treat the "little to no appetite" she had developed because of the Crohn's disease. Id.
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not be a problem."" Shortly after taking the drug test, Barbuto began her
official first day working at ASM." Approximately one day later, ASM
terminated Barbuto for testing positive for marijuana, explaining that the
company did not care if Barbuto used medical marijuana to treat her medical
condition because the company "follows[s] federal law, not state law." 9
In her initial complaint to the trial court, Barbuto asserted various
claims, including invasion of privacy in violation of the Massachusetts
Privacy Act, denial of her rights under the Act, and wrongful termination in
violation of public policy.2 0 Additionally, Barbuto alleged that she was
wrongfully terminated for handicap discrimination in violation of various
provisions of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B - arguing she was a "handicap

" See id. at 40 (following disclosure of medical condition and drug test, Barbuto's offer was
accepted).
1 See id. at 39 (explaining Barbuto worked for one day at Stop & Shop to promote
ASM's
customers' products).
19 See id. at 41 (referencing Controlled Substance Act, ("CSA"), which qualified marijuana as
Schedule I substance, despite medical use); see also 21 U.S.C. § 812 (1970) (listing five scheduled
levels of federally prohibited substances). Under the Controlled Substance Act, marijuana is listed
as a schedule I substance and is scheduled on the same level as heroin. Id The federal CSA
prohibition is thus in contrast with the Act, which provides protection for Massachusetts prescribers
and more importantly, patients who have been provided certain implied "rights or privileges" under
the Act to use medical marijuana to treat their conditions. Id; see also An Act for the Humanitarian
Medical Use of Marijuana, 2012 MASS. AcTs. ch. 369 § 4 ("Any person meeting the requirements
under this law shall not be penalized under Massachusetts law in any manner or denied any right
or privilege, for such actions."); see also Flores, supra note 5, at 2 (describing compliance with
Act). However, even in compliance with the Act, Massachusetts residents and businesses are still
in open defiance of federal law. Id. On the other hand, residents and businesses have been able to
operate under some level of security as Congress has forbidden the United States Department of
Justice (DOJ) from interfering with state medical marijuana programs since 2014. Id. Therefore,
due to this contradiction between state and federal laws, there still remains many unanswered
questions regarding how employers should operate under the Act in light of the CSA. Id.
20 See Barbuto v. Advantage Sales & Mktg., LLC, 2016 WL 8653056, at *1 (Mass. Super. Ct.
2016) aff'd in part, reversed in part 78 N.E. 3d 37 (Mass. 2017) (describing Barbuto's complaint
to Massachusetts Superior Court).
The complaint included six claims: (1) handicap discrimination, in violation of G. L. c.
151B, § 4 (16); (2) interference with her right to be protected from handicap
discrimination, in violation of G. L. c. 15 1B, § 4 (4A); (3) aiding and abetting ASM in
committing handicap discrimination, in violation of G. L. c. 15 1B, § 4 (5); (4) invasion
of privacy, in violation of G. L. c. 214, § 1B; (5) denial of the "right or privilege" to use
marijuana lawfully as a registered patient to treat a debilitating medical condition, in
violation of the medical marijuana act; and (6) violation of public policy by terminating
the plaintiff for lawfully using marijuana for medicinal purposes. The second and third
claims were brought against Villaruz alone; the rest were brought against both ASM and
Villaruz.
Id. Initially Barbuto filed a discrimination charge against ASM and Villaruz with the
Massachusetts Commission against Discrimination ("MCAD"), but later withdrew her MCAD
charge in order to file a complaint in the Superior Court. Id
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person" suffering from Crohn's disease and a "qualified handicap person"
capable of performing the essential functions of her job, and was thus,
entitled to a reasonable accommodation.2 1 In response, after unsuccessfully
attempting to remove the case to the United States District Court, ASM filed
a motion to dismiss all counts of Barbuto's complaint with the Superior
Court on the basis that employers should not be expected to accommodate
the federally prohibited use of a drug. 22 In its motion, ASM argued that the
Act does not require "any accommodation of any-onsite employee use of
marijuana[,]" and further rejected the implication that the Act required the
reasonable accommodation to allow employees to use marijuana off-site, just
because the Act and Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B did not specifically prohibit
an employee's off-site use of marijuana. 23 The Superior Court agreed with
ASM's argument and dismissed all of Barbuto's claims except for her
invasion of privacy claim, reasoning that the Act does not provide immunity
from federal law and further rejected the assertion that Mass. Gen. Laws ch.
151 B would extend far enough to require an accommodation for medical
marijuana given its prohibited federal status. 24

21 See Barbuto, 78 N.E.3d at 41 (claiming ASM discriminated by not providing reasonable
accommodation for Barbuto's medical marijuana use). Barbuto asserted that medicating her
condition with medically prescribed marijuana is a reasonable accommodation and would not
impose undue hardship on ASM. Id; see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151B § 1(16)
(LexisNexis 2017) (explaining "reasonable accommodation" is not defined under Massachusetts
General Law); see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151B §4(16) (LexisNexis 2017) (giving

handicap employees right to accommodation if requested, provided no undue hardship imposed);
Peabody Props., Inc. v. Sherman, 638 N.E.2d 906, 909 (Mass. 1994) ("A 'reasonable
accommodation' is one which would not impose an undue hardship or burden on the entity making
the accommodation."); Godfrey v. Globe Newspaper Co., Inc., 928 N.E.2d 327, 333 (Mass. 2010)
(mandating employer's obligation to work with employee to determine if another accommodation
is more reasonable); Mass. Bay Transp. Auth. v. Mass. Comm'n. Against Discrimination, 879
N.E.2d 36, 49 (Mass. 2008) (requiring employer to "participate in interactive process of
determining [accommodation] at handicapped employees request"); see also Canfield v. Con-Way
Freight, Inc., 578 F. Supp. 2d 235, 240 (D. Mass. 2008) ("[T]o establish a prima facie case of
discriminatory discharge based on handicap under Massachusetts law, plaintiff must show, among
other things, that he is a qualified handicapped person.").
2 See Barbuto v. Advantage Sales & Mktg., LLC, 2016 WL 8653056, at *1 (Mass. Super. Ct.
2016) af'd in part, reversed in part 78 N.E. 3d 37 (Mass. 2017) (attempting to dismiss all claims).
23 See id. at *2 (holding General Law ch. 151B may require employers to accommodate
employee's use of medical marijuana).
24 See id. (reasoning no requirement to accommodate to employee's medical marijuana use
under G.L.c. 15 1B.). The court further bolstered this decision by citing similar decisions in other
states with similar medical marijuana laws; however, the facts of these cases vary from the case at
hand. See Ross v. RagingWire Telecommom., 174 P.3d 200, 204 (Cal. 2008) ("No state law could
completely legalize marijuana for medical purposes because the drug remains illegal under federal
law [21 U.S.C.

§§

812, 844 even for medical users."]; Brandon Coats v. Dish Network, LLC, 350

P.3d 849, 852 (Colo. 2015) (stating licensed medical marijuana use is not "lawful activity" under
Colorado employment discrimination law).
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Barbuto responded by filing a notice of appeal regarding the
dismissed claims, leading to the SJC's direct appellate review.25 On appeal,
Barbuto took the position that ASM should have accommodated her
debilitating condition, by either: (1) not making her take the drug test, or (2)
allowing her to fail the drug test without any adverse employment
consequences.2 6 ASM rejected Barbuto's claim, arguing that Barbuto failed
to state a claim for handicap discrimination for two reasons: (1) she was not
a "qualified handicap person" because her requested accommodation, the use
of medical marijuana, was facially unreasonable due to marijuana's federal
prohibition; and (2) even if she was to be considered a "qualified handicap
person," she was terminated not because she was handicap, but because she
failed a drug test that all employees were required to pass. 27 The SJC found
in favor of ASM's argument and upheld the dismissal of Barbuto's wrongful
termination claim and implied a private right of action under the Act.
However, the SJC reversed the dismissal of Barbuto's claim under Mass.
Gen. Laws ch. 151B and unanimously decided that Barbuto's Crohn's
disease was a "handicap" and held that Barbuto's proposed accommodation
to use medical marijuana to treat her was "facially reasonable." 28 The SJC
also found that ASM should have engaged in the interactive process to find
a reasonable accommodation for Barbuto.29 Thus, while Barbuto was
25 See Barbuto, 78 N.E.3d at 40 (reviewing de novo on appeal whether qualifying patient may
be terminated from employment).
26 See id at 43 (asserting if handicap discrimination is appropriate then accommodation is
necessary if facially reasonable); see also Godfrey v. Globe Newspaper Co., Inc., 928 N.E.2d 327,
334 (Mass. 2010) (explaining hesitation to set hard and fast rules for determining when
accommodation is facially reasonable).
27 See Barbuto, 78 N.E.3d at 45 (explaining ASM arguments); see also Garcia v. Tractor
Supply Co., 154 F.Supp.3d 1225, 1229 (D.N.M. 2016) ("Medical marijuana is not an
accommodation that must be provided for by the employer."); Coats v. Dish Network, LLC, 350
P.3d 849, 851 (Colo. 2015) (upholding employee's termination due to medical marijuana
consumption despite authorization as "lawful activity" within state); An Act for the Humanitarian
Medical Use of Marijuana, 2012 MASS. ACTS CH. 369, § 7(D) (providing Act does not require any
employer to permit "on-site" marijuana use as accommodation).
28 See Barbuto, 78 N.E.3d at 45 (rejecting ASM's argument that accommodation was
unreasonable because continued marijuana use would be federal crime); see also Flores, supranote
5, at 2 (addressing quote) ("According to the court, the mere fact that marijuana remains illegal
under federal law does not relieve employers from their obligations under state law-specifically,
the obligation under Chapter 151B to engage in the interactive process and to provide reasonable
accommodations for handicapped employees.").
29 See Barbuto, 78 N.E.3d at 45 (explaining even if accommodation of medical marijuana was
facially unreasonable, duty was still owed).
[T]he employer here still owed the plaintiff an obligation under ch. 151B §4(16), before
it terminated her employment, to participate in the interactive process to explore with
her whether there was an alternative, equally effective medication she could use that was
not prohibited by the employer's drug policy. This failure to explore a reasonable
accommodation alone is sufficient to support a claim of handicap discrimination
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successful in her claims against ASM for handicap discrimination, the SJC
held that she did not have an implied private right of action under medical
marijuana law, or a claim for wrongful termination as a matter of public
policy under the Act.30 In conclusion, the SJC established that if an
employer's tolerance of an employee's use of medical marijuana was a
facially reasonable accommodation, then the employer effectively would be
denying this "right or privilege" provided for under both Mass. Gen. Laws
ch. 151B and the Act.31 In turn, this decision established that a handicapped
provided the plaintiff proves that a reasonable accommodation existed that would have
enabled her to be a "qualified handicapped person."
Id. at 47; see also MCAD Guidelines §VII.C, available at https://www.mass.gov/lists/mcadstatutes-and-regulations [hereinafer MCAD Guidelines] ("[E]mployer should initiate an informal
interactive process... identify the precise limitation resulting from handicap and potential
reasonable accommodations that could overcome those limitations."); see also Flores, supra note
5, at 75 (explaining effect of MCAD policy in conjunction with Act). The MCAD still maintains
a policy that employers may "establish and enforce drug and alcohol related work rules, including
but not limited to... requiring employees to comply with all state and federal drug and alcoholrelated laws or regulations to which the employing unit and/or its employees are subject." MCAD
Guidelines at §IV. Additionally, in its amicus curaie, the MCAD suggested that the "federal drug
and alcohol-related laws" to which it was referring are only those that govern employees as
employees. For example, U.S. Department of Transportation regulations that apply to certain types
of safety-sensitive positions and not to all federal drug laws "to which .. . its employees are
subject" more generally. Id. The current MCAD policy, read in light of the decision under Barbuto,
can be interpreted to require employers to ignore their drug policies when an employee's off-site
use of an illegal drug is treatment for a debilitating condition and does not create an undue burden.
Id.; see also Brief and Addendum of Amicus Curiae Massachusetts Commission against
Discrimination at *19 n.9, Flagg v. Alimed, Inc., 992 N.E.2d 354, (Mass. 2013) (quoting MCAD
Guidelines § X.C.4).
30 See Barbuto, 78 N.E.3d at 47 (rejecting Barbuto's remaining claims that her termination was
wrongful and violated public policy). The SJC reasoned they would not allow for these claims
because they felt they had provided for a claim of right by providing a remedy under discrimination
law, and allowing for additional claims could create confusion. Id. at 50. ("[W]here a comparable
cause of action already exists under our law prohibiting handicap discrimination, a separate,
implied private right of action is not necessary to protect a patient using medical marijuana from
being unjustly terminated for its use."). Id.
31 See id. at 44 (correlating handicap employee denial of insulin is similar to employee denied
medical marijuana). The SJC supported its reasoning by analogizing a scenario where an employer
upheld a drug policy which prohibited the use of lawfully prescribed insulin by a physician to a
diabetic, and further explained that the employer would still have a duty to engage in an interactive
process with the employee to determine whether there was an equally effective medical alternative.
Id. at 47. "(W]here a handicapped employee needs medication to alleviate or manage the medical
condition ... and the employer fires her because company policy prohibits the use of this
medication, the law does not ignore the fact that the policy resulted in a person being denied
employment because of her handicap." Id.; compare Garcia v. Tractor Supply Co., 154 F.Supp.3d
1225, 1229 (D.N.M. 2016) ("medical marijuana is not accommodation that must be provided by
employer") with Coats v. Dish Network, LLC, 350 P.3d at 851 (Colo. 2015) (discharging employee
based on employee's participation in "lawful activities" off-site during nonworking hours) and
Ross v. RagingWire Telecomm., Inc., 174 P.3d 200, 204 (Cal. 2008) (finding California's statute
prohibiting handicap discrimination does not require employees to accommodate to illegal drugs).
Deviating from the Ross decision, the Barbuto court concluded to provide an employee with a claim
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employee in Massachusetts has a statutory "right or privilege" to a
reasonable accommodation under the Act, which may now include
reasonable accommodations for an employee's use of prescribed medical
marijuana.32
Prior to the passage of the Act, medical marijuana was strictly
prohibited in Massachusetts, and possession of marijuana was a punishable
felony.33 Medical marijuana is still prohibited under federal law, and a
qualifying patient in Massachusetts who has been lawfully prescribed
marijuana still remains subject to potential criminal penalties.34 However,
states are able to authorize the legalization of marijuana under the
Rohrabacher Blumenauer Amendment.3 5 Additionally, from 2013 to 2017,
of action for the denial of the employee's use of medical marijuana. Barbuto, 78 N.E.3d at 44. This
is a different decision compared to other state courts which prohibited the treatment of statelegalized medical marijuana in the employment context. Id. The Barbuto court supported its
divergence from other state courts by reasoning the differences in language in the Act compared to
other state statutes. Id.
32 See Barbuto, 78 N.E.3d at 45 (allowing accommodation for employee being treated with
medical marijuana for debilitating condition). This requirement to accommodate does not extend
to on-site use, as "on-site" use is federally prohibited. Id. "[T]he termination of the employee for
violating that policy effectively denies a handicapped employee the opportunity of a reasonable
accommodation, and therefore is appropriately recognized as handicap discrimination." Id. at 47;
see also Flores, supranote 5, at 76 (explaining medical marijuana is not reasonable when there are
safety risks). The establishment of a medical marijuana accommodation does not mean that an
employee will be instantly granted that right, as an employer may defeat the medical marijuana
accommodation by proving that it is unreasonable, unduly burdensome to the employer's business,
would "impair the employee's performance of her work," create an "unacceptably significant safety
risk", or require the employer to violate a contractual or statutory obligation. Id.
3 See 21 U.S.C. § 842 (2018) (explaining CSA makes it illegal to manufacture, distribute, or
possess controlled substances except as authorized); see also An Act for the Humanitarian Medical
Use of Marijuana, 2012 MASS. ACTS ch. 369 § 7(F) ("[N]othing in this law requires the violation
of federal law or purports to give immunity under federal law."). However, the implication was
that the off-site use of medically prescribed marijuana is lawful under state law. Id.
34 See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 27 (2005) (continuing to recognize medical marijuana
as Schedule I drug, with "no acceptable medical uses"); see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151B
§ 1(16) (LexisNexis 2018) (finding no requirement for Massachusetts employers to accommodate
to use of medical marijuana in workplace).
at
available
(2013-14)
Congress
113th
748,
H.AMDT.
35 See
https://www.congress.gov/amendment/113th-congress/house-amendment/748/text (providing text
of Amendment). The Rohrabacher-Farr Amendment otherwise known as the RohrabacherBlumenaur Amendment, was signed into law by President Obama on December 16, 2014, and
materially changed the legal landscape for the U.S. cannabis industry. Id. The Amendment states:
"None of the funds made available in this Act to the Department of Justice may be used ... to
prevent such states from implementing their own state laws that authorize the use, distribution,
possession, or cultivation of medical marijuana." Id. Furthermore, the Amendment was renewed
on September 28, 2018, and shall remain in effect through September 30, 2019. Id.; see also David
Wenger, Risk ofFederalEnforcement Actions Against State-Legal CannabisBusinesses Declines,
NEW CANNABIS VENTURES (Jan. 10, 2019,2:57 PM), https://www.newcannabisventures.com/riskof-federal-enforcement-actions-against-state-legal-cannabis-businesses-declines/ (describing risks
of cannabis industry).
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individuals and companies complying with state legalized medical marijuana
programs were able to seek protection from federal prosecution under the
Cole Memorandum, which instructed prosecutors and law enforcement
agencies to focus only on marijuana related activities outside of state-legal
cannabis operations, with medical marijuana enforcement not being one of
the specific priorities.36 However, on January 4, 2018, former Attorney
General Jefferson Sessions rescinded the Cole Memorandum and issued a
separate memorandum giving federal prosecutors the freedom to prosecute
marijuana cultivation, distribution, and possession as they would any other
federal crime.3 7 Nevertheless, since the Cole Memorandum was rescinded,
not a single prosecutor has acted against the industry, and the decision to
prosecute will continue to remain in the hands of the U.S. Attorneys.3 8
Additionally, it is likely the U.S. Attorneys will continue to refrain from
taking action to prosecute especially in light of the support that medical
marijuana legalization has received both from the public and under the
Rohrabacher-Blumenauer Amendment.39 Therefore, even without the Cole
Memorandum, the federal protection of the medical cannabis industry
remains promising, and while there are no guarantees that federal
enforcement may not come down on employers or individuals, the current
regulatory landscape and progress towards federal legalization suggest that

36 See James M. Cole, Deputy Attorney General, Memorandum for All United States
Attorneys: GuidanceRegarding Maryuana Enforcement, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE (Aug. 29, 2013),
available at
http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/3052013829132756857467.pdf
(authorizing
state
regulated marijuana in compliance with provisions of memorandum).
3 See Memorandum from J. Sessions to U.S. Attorneys (Jan. 4. 2018), available at
https://wwwjustice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1022196/download (last visited Mar. 6, 2019)
(deciding how to prosecute medical marijuana).
38 See David Wenger, Risk of Federal Enforcement Actions Against State-Legal Cannabis
Businesses Declines, NEW CANNABIS
VENTURES
(Jan.
10, 2019, 2:57 PM),
https://www.newcannabisventures.com/risk-of-federal-enforcement-actions-against-state-legalcannabis-businesses-declines/ (explaining position of U.S. Attorneys on medical marijuana
enforcement).
3 See Lisa Sacco, Erin Bagalman, Kristin Kinlea & Sean Lowry, The MarijuanaPolicy Gap
and
the
Path
Forward,
CONG.
RESEARCH
SERV.,
(Mar.
10,
2017)
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44782.pdf (explaining nearly ninety percent of states allow
limited possession of marijuana for medical treatment); see also United States v. Tote, 1: 14-MJ00212-SAB, 2015 WL 3732010, at *2 (E.D. Cal. 2015) (providing legislative history suggests
Amendment's intent to give states control over medical marijuana policy); David Wenger, Risk of
FederalEnforcement Actions Against State-Legal CannabisBusinesses Declines, NEW CANNABIS
VENTURES (Jan. 10, 2019, 2:57 PM), https://www.newcannabisventures.com/risk-of-federalenforcement-actions-against-state-legal-cannabis-businesses-declines/ ("Prosecutors across the
country considering their career ambitions would be hard-pressed to see any upside is starting an
enforcement action against a state-legal cannabis business.").
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there is little-to-no material risk of federal enforcement action against
40
businesses or individuals who are compliant with state law.
With the federal law on marijuana geared toward state regulation, it
is essential that employers, businesses, and individuals within Massachusetts
understand the development of the Act and how it intersects and operates
with Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 15 1B, and the federal law, as the innerworkings
41
of these governing authorities proved to be a central issue in Barbuto. In
Massachusetts, the Act defines a "qualifying patient" as "a person who has
been diagnosed by a licensed physician as having a debilitating medical
42
condition," which by the terms of the statute, includes Crohn's disease. in
drafting the Act, the legislature included specific wording to explain that a
qualifying patient shall be protected from "arrest or prosecution or civil
penalty for the use of marijuana," provided the patient complies with the
conditions of the Act.4 3 In solidifying its intent to provide protection for
medical marijuana patients, the legislature went a step further by inserting

&

4 See Wenger, supra note 38 (explaining enforcement techniques); see also Jeremy Berke
Skye Gould, New Jersey lawmakers postoponeda criticalvote to legalize mariuana- here are all
11:38 AM),
the states where pot it legal, Bus. INSIDER (Mar. 26, 2019,
(outlining all states where
https://www.businessinsider.com/legal-marijuana-states-2018-1
marijuana initiatives have been taken).
41 See David B. Wilson and Jason McGraw, Barbuto v. Advantage Sales & Marketing, LLC:
Employers May Risk Disability DiscriminationClaims by ProhibitingUse of Medical Maryuana
by Qualified DisabledEmployees, BOSTON BAR J., (Oct. 26, 2017), available at
https://bostonbajournal.com/2017/10/26/barbuto-v-advantage-sales-marketing-l1c-employersmay-risk-disability-discrimination-claims-by-prohibiting-use-of-medical-marijuana-by-qualifieddisabled-employees/ (considering whether Medical Marijuana Act is preempted by federal law).
See Flores,supra note 5, at 73 (explaining employers endure conflicts when asked to satisfy federal
and state marijuana laws). For instance, employers are asked to satisfy the "Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) and its state law counterpart, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, both of which
forbid employers from discriminating against prospective and current employees on the basis of
disability, require employers to make reasonable accommodations if they would allow disabled
employees to perform the essential functions of the job, and imposes potentially devastating civil
liability for any missteps." Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12111 (2012) et seq.; MASS GEN. LAWS ch.
151B §§ 4(16), 9 (LexisNexis 2017) (highlighting importance of employers understanding medical
marijuana regulations to maintain compliance).
42 See An Act for the Humanitarian Medical Use of Marijuana, 2012 MASS. ACTS ch. 369
§2(K) (outlining conditions that are expressly permissible for treatment with medically prescribed
Additional conditions include: cancer, glaucoma, positive status for human
marijuana).
immunodeficiency virus (HIV), acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS), hepatitis
C, amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS), Crohn's disease, Parkinson's disease, multiple
sclerosis and other conditions as determined in writing by a qualifying patient's physician. Id.
43 See An Act for the Humanitarian Medical Use of Marijuana, 2012 MASS. ACTS ch. 369 §
2(K) ("A patient possesses no more marijuana than is necessary for the patient's personal, medical
use, not exceeding the amount necessary for a sixty-day supply; and (b) [presents] his or her
registration card to any law enforcement official who questions the patients ... regarding the use
of marijuana."). Id. § 4a-b.
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language in the Act which states that medical marijuana patients shall not be
denied "any right or privilege" on the basis of their medical marijuana use."
Generally, once an employee has proven that they are a qualified
handicap person, they have an explicit right under Mass. Gen. Laws ch.
151(B) §4(a), not to be discriminated against solely because of their
handicap. 45 That right includes the right to require an employer to make a
reasonable accommodation, such as an accommodation for a person's
medication, to enable the employee to perform the essential functions of their
job with the accommodation-provided the accommodation is reasonable
under the circumstances.' The duty to provide reasonable accommodation
applies to all qualified handicap employees and is intended to reduce workrelated barriers related to an individual's handicap. 47 Furthermore, the
employer need not provide the best accommodation available, or the
accommodation specifically requested by the individual with the handicap,
but merely a reasonable one.48 However, if the accommodation proposed
4 See id. § 4 ("Any person meeting the requirements under this law shall not be penalized
under Massachusetts law in any manner, or denied any right or privilege, for such actions."). Thus,
the choice to include this language implies that under the Act, patients shall not be denied "any
right or privilege" on the basis of their medical marijuana. Id. Further, it is to be noted that the
"right or privilege" language in this Act is unique from the language in other states, such as
California, that explicitly chose to leave out this language. See Barbuto, 78 N.E.3d at 45 n.7
(distinguishing Massachusetts Act with California Supreme Court decision which denied
employees' challenge under similar claims). The decision to include the language provided the
SJC with a sound basis to reason that the legislature had the intent to protect medical marijuana
patients in its conclusion. Id.
45 See MASS GEN. ANN. LAWS ch. 151B § 4(16) (LexisNexis 2017) ("A qualified individual
with disability refers to those individuals with a disability who: (1) satisfy the general skill,
experience, education and other job-related requirements, and (2) can perform the essential
functions of the job, with or without reasonable accommodation."); see also Employment rightsof
people with disabilities, MASS.Gov. (2018), available at https://www.mass.gov/servicedetails/employment-rights-of-people-with-disabilities (explaining employment rights of people
with disabilities). Essential functions are narrowly defined to include fundamental job duties. Id.
"A job function is more likely to be 'essential' if it requires special expertise, a large amount of
time, or if that function was listed in the written job description prepared before the employer
advertised for or interviewed job applicants." Id.; see also Massachusetts Commission Against
Discrimination, Guidelines: Employment Discriminationon the Basis of Handicap, Ch. 15 1B, §
IX.A.3 (1998) (explaining handicap may limit major life functions including seeing, hearing
mobility, and working). Further, it is important to note that Massachusetts law uses the word
"handicap" and the Federal Americans with Disabilities Act uses the word "disability", but the laws
are very similar. Id.
4 See MASS GEN. LAWS ch. 151B § 4(B) (LexisNexis 2017) (defining reasonable
accommodation). "Reasonable accommodation" refers to an employment-related modification that
an employer must make in order to ensure equal opportunity for an individual with a disability to
(1) apply for and test for ajob; (2) perform essential job functions; and (3) receive the same benefits
and privileges as other employees. Id.
47 See Cargill v. Harvard Univ., 804 N.E.2d 377, 386 (Mass. App. Ct. 2004) (establishing
"essential job function" is "intensely fact-based," requiring "individualized inquiry").
48 See id. (providing scope of employers reasonable accommodation).
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by the employee appears unduly onerous, the employer has an obligation to
at least have a conversation with the employee to determine whether another
accommodation is possible.49
Moreover, within Massachusetts, an employer may not dismiss from
employment or refuse to hire "any person alleging to be a qualified
handicapped person, capable of performing the essential functions of the
position involved with reasonable accommodation" unless the
accommodation would impose undue hardship on the employer's business. 0
Therefore, courts have established that in order to justify an employer's
refusal to reasonably accommodate the medical needs of the qualified
handicap employee, an employer must prove that the employee's use of the
accommodation, such as the use of medication, would cause an undue
hardship to the employer's business.s" The case-in-chief is the first case in
Massachusetts to recognize that an employee has a claim for handicap
discrimination based upon an employer's unwillingness to accommodate an
employee for the use of medical marijuana.5 2
49 See id. (citing Cox. V. New England Tel. Co., 607 N.E.2d 1035, 1040 (Mass. 1993))
("[D]etermination [of essential function] should be based upon more than statements in a job
description and should reflect the actual functioning and circumstances of the particular enterprise
involved."); Reed v. LePage Bakeries, Inc., 244 F.3d 254, 259 (1st Cir. 2001) (explaining plaintiff
must show accommodation is "feasible for the employer under the circumstances"). Massachusetts
law does not require that an employer provide a reasonable accommodation in the form of
reassignment to a new or different position. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151B § 4 (LexisNexis 2017).
Instead, Mass. Gen. Laws. ch. 151B § 4 requires only that the employer provide reasonable
accommodation in the form of modifications to an employee's existing position. Id.
so See Godfrey v. Globe Newspaper Co., Inc., 928 N.E.2d 327, 328 (Mass. 2010) (explaining
potential for undue hardship with accommodation increases if position involves safety concerns);
see also Webster v. Motorola, Inc., 637 N.E.2d 203, 208 (Mass. 1994) (noting undue hardship
nexus between job responsibilities and risk of harm is "attenuated").
" See Gannon v. City of Bos., 73 N.E.3d 748, 749 (Mass. 2017) (asking whether officer was
able to perform as qualified handicap without posing risk to others); Godfrey v. Globe Newspaper
Co., Inc., 928 N.E.2d 327, 328 (Mass. 2010) (establishing employer has obligation to work with
employee to determine whether another accommodation is possible); see also Cox v. New England
Tel. & Tel. Co., 607 N.E.2d 1035, 1042 (Mass. 1993) (determining burden of proof shifts to
employer to show accommodation would impose undue hardship).
52 See Barbuto v. Advantage Sales and Mktg., LLC, 78 N.E.3d 40, 45 (Mass. 2017)
(determining Massachusetts medically prescribed marijuana is just as lawful as other prescribed
medication); see also Mark Pomfret & Kristi Nickodem, Massachusetts'sHighest Court Rules that
Employee Firedfor Medical MarituanaUse Can Hold Employer Liablefor Discrimination,K&L
GATES (Jul. 26, 2017), available at http://www.klgates.com/massachusettss-highest-court-rulesthat-employee-fired-for-medical-marijuana-use-can-hold-employer-liable-fordiscrimination/#footnote2 (highlighting Barbuto decision as marked departure from prior state
court rulings). This ruling departs from similar cases in California, Colorado, Oregon, and
Washington, where courts have found that employers had no duty to accommodate an employee's
use of medical marijuana. See Coats v. Dish Network, LLC, 350 P.3d 849, 850 (Colo. 2015)
(allowing employee's termination due to medical marijuana usage despite state authorization as
"lawful activity"); Emerald Steel Fabricators, Inc. v. Bureau of Labor & Indus., 230 P.3d 518, 520
(Or. 2010) (declining interpretation of state discrimination laws requiring employers to
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In Barbuto v. Advantage Sales & Mktg., the SJC reversed the holding
of the trial court and opened the door to the possibility that employers within
Massachusetts may now be obligated to work with employees to create a
reasonable accommodation for medical marijuana." In coming to its
conclusion, the SJC considered the conflicting implications of enacting the
2012 Medical Marijuana Act, which provided that "any person prescribed
medical marijuana under the law shall not be penalized in any manner or
denied any right or privilege for such actions."S4 This provision of the Act
is in direct conflict with Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151 B, which have historically
provided that employers do not have an obligation to accommodate an
employee for using marijuana."
Ultimately, the court concluded that despite marijuana's federally
prohibited status, employers within Massachusetts are still under the
obligation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151 B to engage in the interactive process
and to provide reasonable accommodations for qualified handicapped
employees, which may include accommodating an employee's medical use
of marijuana-provided no "equally effective alternative" exists. 6 Thus, the
accommodate use of medical marijuana); Ross v. RagingWire Telecomm., Inc. 174 P.3d 200, 204
(Cal. 2008) (holding employee did not have cause of action for wrongful termination after failing
drug test); Swaw v. Safeway, Inc., No. C15-939, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 159761 (W.D. Wash.
2015) (determining Washington's Medical Use of Marijuana Act "does not require employers to
accommodate medical marijuana."). Specifically, Emerald contained facts very similar to Barbuto,
and ultimately went to the Oregon Supreme Court; however, the Emerald court held that an
employee's use of medical marijuana was not a reasonable accommodation under the State's

disability act on similar grounds. Emerald, 230 P.3d at 530. In this case, the Oregon Supreme Court
based their reasoning on the basis that Congress lacks the authority to require Oregon to prohibit
the use of medical marijuana and held that Oregon was only free to exempt medical marijuana use
from criminal liability. Id.
5 See Barbuto, 78 N.E.3d at 41 (explaining requirement reserved for very limited employment
situations).
54 See An Act for the Humanitarian Medical Use of Marijuana, 2012 MASS. ACTS ch. 369 §4
("[Qualifying patients] shall not be penalized under Massachusetts law in any manner, or denied
any right or privilege, [for their medical marijuana use]."). However, the Act explicitly states that
any "on-site" medical marijuana use by an employee is strictly prohibited as a reasonable
accommodation. Id.
5 See Barbuto v. Advantage Sales & Mktg., LLC, 2016 WL 8653056, at *2 (Mass. Super. Ct.
2016) affdinpart, reversedin part 78 N.E.3d 37 (Mass. 2017) (arguing that accommodation under
151B does not include medical marijuana because marijuana is federally illegal). The primary
argument by courts in the past was that employment discrimination statues did not cover medical
marijuana prescription use because "state disability discrimination statutes do not extend to
marijuana use for medical purposes because such use remains illegal under federal law." Id. at *3
(citing Ross, 174 P.3d at 204; Coats, 350 P.3d at 852).
56 See Barbuto, 78 N.E.3d at 44 (elaborating Court did not need additional details about
Barbuto's condition to declare handicap). Still, the Court determined she could perform the
functions of her job with a reasonable accommodation as a "qualified handicap employee." Id
Where, in the opinion of the employee's physician, medical marijuana is the most
effective medication for the employee's debilitating medical condition and where any
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court held that because Barbuto was a qualified handicap employee, a
facially reasonable accommodation for Barbuto may include taking the
appropriate medication.57 In this case, the Court held the off-site use of
medical marijuana to allow Barbuto to perform the essential functions of her
job was facially reasonable as an accommodation, and reasoned if ASM were
to prohibit the use of medical marijuana as treatment for a debilitating
condition, they would be denying Barbuto, a qualified handicap employee,
the opportunity of a reasonable accommodation, which is effectively
handicap discrimination.
Furthermore, the court held that firing Barbuto
for the proposed use of the accommodation of medical marijuana before
engaging in the interactive process to explore an alternative equally effective
medication not prohibited by the employer's drug policy was sufficient
enough on its own to support a claim for handicap discrimination under
Mass. Gen Laws ch. 15 1B. 59
While this case only introduces the prospect for an employee to have
a claim against their employer, this decision by the SJC is revolutionary
nonetheless as it provides a new opportunity for a claim to be brought by an
employee facing adverse action as a result of their qualified handicap.'
alternative medication whose use would be permitted by the employer's drug policy
would be less effective, an exception to an employer's drug policy to permit its use is a
facially reasonable accommodation.
Id. at 45.

5' See id. at 46 (holding that use of medical marijuana is not per se unreasonable as
accommodation). "To declare an accommodation for medical marijuana to be per se unreasonable
out of respect for Federal law would not be respectful of the recognition of Massachusetts
voters ..... Id.
" See id. at 44 (analogizing handicap employee denied insulin as similar to employee denied
medical marijuana). Where a handicapped employee needs medication to alleviate or manage the
medical condition that renders her handicapped, and the employer fires her because company policy
prohibits the use of this medication, the law does not ignore the fact that the policy resulted in a
person being denied employment because of her handicap. Id. at 47.
' See id. at 45 (explaining justification for proving undue hardship):
Where no equally effective alternative exists, the employer bears the burden of proving
that the employee's use of the medication would cause an undue hardship to the
employer's business in order to justify the employer's refusal to make an exception to
the drug policy reasonably to accommodate the medical needs of the handicapped
employee.
Id.; see also Godfrey v. Globe Newspaper Co., Inc., 928 N.E.2d 327, 334 (Mass. 2010) (quoting
Cox v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 607 N.E.2d 1035, 1040 (Mass. 1993)) ("Once an employee
'make[s] at least a facial showing that reasonable accommodation is possible,' the burden of proof
of both production and persuasion shifts to the employer to establish that a suggested
accommodation would impose an undue hardship.").
See Barbuto, 78 N.E.3d. at 47 (explaining decision to reverse handicap discrimination does
6
not necessarily mean Barbuto will succeed on claim). "The defendants at summary judgment or
trial may offer evidence to meet their burden to show that the plaintiff's use of medical marijuana
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However, it does not guarantee that an employee will win on the handicap
discrimination claim.6 1
The SJC in Barbuto correctly recognized that the use and possession
of medically prescribed marijuana, by a qualifying patient, may be just as
lawful as the use and possession of any other prescribed medication.6 2
Granted, the SJC provided that this accommodation may be reasonable if,
and only if, the employee proves that medical marijuana is the most effective
medication to treat the employee's qualified handicap, and demonstrates that
the proposed "authorized" alternative would be less effective.
In deciding this case, the SJC was at a crossroads between respecting
the rigid federal regulations and respecting the intent of the legislatures and
citizens who had collectively voted upon the Act with an intention of
providing medical marijuana users, just like Barbuto, protection from being
penalized for using effective medication.' The court sided with the latter,
and decided to allow Barbuto's handicap discrimination claim to move
forward, implicitly recognizing that under very specific circumstances,
medical marijuana may now be permitted as a facially reasonable

is not a reasonable accommodation because it would impose an undue hardship on the defendants'
business." Id. at 48.
61 See id. at 47 (explaining Barbutodoes not give employees right to medical marijuana if use
violates company policy). For instance, transportation employers who are subject to regulations
promulgated by the United States Department of Transportation that prohibit any safety-sensitive
employee subject to drug testing under the Department's drug testing regulations from using
marijuana. Id. at 48.
62 See id. at 45 (accommodating handicapped employee's off-site use of marijuana pursuant to
valid prescription is facially reasonable).
63 See id. (concluding where no equally effective "federally authorized" alternative, employer
must prove medication causes undue hardship). In the case at hand, ASM was not justified in
refusing to make an exception to their drug policy to accommodate the medical needs of their
handicap employee. Id The SJC explained that an accommodation to ASM's drug policy would
not be facially unreasonable because the only person at risk of federal criminal prosecution for the
possession of medical marijuana is the employee. Id. at 46. Employers commit no crime by merely
tolerating use of the drug because an employer would not be in joint possession of medical
marijuana or aid and abet its possession simply by permitting an employee to continue his or her
off-site use. Id. at 47.
6 See Barbuto, 78 N.E.3d at 47 (shying away from interpretations of federal law which
completely prohibit possession especially where lawfully prescribed). Further, the intent to include
a cause of action for handicap discrimination is made inherently clear by the enumeration of a
provision within the Act which prohibits 'on-site' medical marijuana use as an 'accommodation,"'
but is silent as to the 'off site' use of medical marijuana. Id.; see also An Act for the Humanitarian
Medical Use of Marijuana, 2012 MASS. ACTS ch. 369, § 7 (D) (providing language that bars denial
of "right or privilege" for medial marijuana use). This language suggests a preexisting "right or
privilege" for the medical use of marijuana as implicated in the language from the Act which bars
an already exsisting "right or privilege". Id. § 4.
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accommodation, despite an employer's policy against marijuana and federal
law.65

Furthermore, in outlining its reasoning, the SJC provided a rough
blueprint for future employers to apply when an employee has established
that they are a qualified handicap person and that their use of medical
marijuana would provide a reasonable accommodation.6 6 However, the
blueprint effectively stops there as the SJC acknowledged that they were not
willing to decide whether Barbuto's requested accommodation to use
medical marijuana would impose undue hardship on the employers business,
noting that that decision is best left to the trial court.
Thus, this decision by the SJC was a step towards a more tolerant
direction, as it not only allowed for employees to establish a handicap
discrimination claim against employers who deny them their statutory "right
or privilege" to a reasonable accommodation, but it also created case
precedent which implicitly developed an affirmative "right or privilege" for
qualified patients in Massachusetts to use marijuana for medical purposes
under limited circumstances and without fear of unreasonable employment
termination." With not much case law or statutory intent to rely upon, the
See Barbuto, 78 N.E.3d at 47 ("[T]he law does not ignore the fact that the policy resulted in
a person being denied employment because of her handicap.").
I See id at 48 (holding employer must engage in interactive process before firing employee
who tests positive for marijuana). The court compared state court decisions which rejected
employees' claims for wrongful termination due to medical marijuana use. Id. at 45 n.7.
67 See id at 48 ("Whether the employer met its burden of proving that the requested
accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the employer's business is an issue that may
be resolved through a motion for summary judgment or at trial; it is not appropriately addressed
through a motion to dismiss."); see also Erica E. Flores, Accommodating Employee Use ofMedical
Marijuana,99 MASS. L. REV. 72, 73 (2018) (providing examples of questions employers may now
have under Barbuto decision).
61

Barbuto raises more questions than it answers-such as what is acceptable proof of
registered status, what is an "unacceptably significant" safety risk, who should decide
whether there is an "equally effective alternative" and what process should an employer
follow to obtain such a determination, can an employer challenge that determination or
obtain a second opinion, and when can an employer obtain recertification of an
employee's continued need for the accommodation.
Id.
68 See Barbuto, 78 N.E.3d at 47 (recognizing that off-site medical use of marijuana might be
permissible accommodation); see also Ross v. RagingWire Telecomm., Inc., 174 P.3d 200, 207
(Cal. 2008) (comparing California statute containing no language to provide users with right or
privilege). The SJC cites to Ross to recognize the main difference as to why the plaintiff was
successful in her handicap claims in Barbuto compared to the California case, is due to the language
of the statute. Barbuto, 78 N.E.3d at 45 n.7. Nothing in the text or history of the California statute
suggests the voters intended the measure to address the respective "rights and obligations" of
employers and employees. Id. at 44. In comparison, the Act specifically includes language to
address the "rights and privileges" of medical marijuana users. Id
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SJC analyzed the spectrum of authority governing medical marijuana.69 On
the one side was the federal law which provides that medical marijuana has
"no accepted medical use in treatment in the United States," and on the other
side was the decision of nearly ninety percent of the states which have
enacted laws recognizing the medical use of marijuana.70
In coming to its conclusion, the court firmly established that Barbuto
had the right and privilege to treat her condition using the appropriate
medication, without termination, similar to any other handicap employee
with a debilitating condition that could be treated using medication."
Moreover, the courts decision created greater protections for marijuana
patients, and also served as a means to judicially recognize the medical use
of marijuana as an effective treatment for the prescribed conditions
enumerated within the Act.72 Specifically, the SJC's analogy comparing
Barbuto's circumstances to an employer who denied an employee with
diabetes from using effective yet federally prohibited insulin provided some
much needed clarity about the court's understanding of the severity of the
issue. 73

In Barbuto v. Advantage Sales & Mktg., the decision to hold that
medical marijuana patients have a qualified right to use medical marijuana
in certain circumstances, notwithstanding federal law, is a complete
departure from existing law. In its reasoning, the SJC established that when
marijuana is used to treat a "qualified handicap" and is reasonable under the
69 See Barbuto, 78 N.E.3d at 45 n.7 (distinguishing Act with similar
statutes from other states).

70 See Barbuto, 78 N.E.3d at 46 (recognizing other states decisions to protect medical
marijuana users); but see Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 27 (2005) ("The [Controlled Substances
Act] designates marijuana as contraband for any purpose; in fact, by characterizing marijuana as a
Schedule I drug, Congress expressly found that the drug has no acceptable medical uses"). See
Barbuto, 78 N.E.3d at 49 ("In considering whether there is any such indication from the voters, we
look to the closest equivalent to legislative history ... which is the voters guide."). The court also
looked to federal law and opinions from state courts discussing the legalization of medical
marijuana. Id. Another aspect the court took into consideration in determining the intent of the Act
was the legalization of recreational marijuana in Massachusetts. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 94G
(2017) (legalizing recreational possession and use of marijuana by persons over twenty-one).
However, the legalization of recreational marijuana within Massachusetts is irrelevant as to the
substantive facts of the Barbuto decision because "Barbuto's possession and use of marijuana for
medical marijuana use was already lawful at the time her employment was terminated." Barbuto,
78 N.E.3d at 49.
71 See Barbuto, 78 N.E.3d at 45 (asserting Barbuto could have competently performed her
marketing associate job while treating with medical marijuana); see also Cargill v. Harvard Univ.,
804 N.E.2d 377, 386 (Mass. App. Ct. 2004) (requiring appropriate findings of fact before making
determination about reasonable accommodation).
72 See Barbuto, 78 N.E.3d at 48 (suggesting provisions that would be acceptable for denying
employee's use of medical marijuana). Even when medical marijuana would be used to rightfully
treat a debilitating condition. Id.
73 See id at 44 (analogizing handicap employee denied insulin as equivalent to employee
denied medical marijuana).
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circumstances, an employee's use of medical marijuana may be protected by
a "right or privilege" encompassed within the Act and General Laws.
Subsequently, a qualified handicap employee in Massachusetts may bring a
legitimate handicap discrimination claim against their employer for
terminating their employment for the off-site and disclosed use of medical
marijuana when it is legally prescribed and is a reasonable accomodation to
treat the employee's condition. Furthermore, this decision confirmed that
even when an employer believes an accommodation for the use of medical
marijuana is unreasonable, the employer, at the very least, has an obligation
to participate in the interactive process for the purpose of determining if there
is an alternative treatment.
In conclusion, the effect of the Barbuto decision is two-fold. It
undoubtedly answers elementary questions regarding the treatment of
medical marijuana in Massachusetts, especially in an employment context.
However, it also leaves open a lot of questions to be answered-specifically,
in regard to how employers, both within Massachusetts and in other medical
marijuana states, should now handle employees who disclose their use of
medical marijuana for treatment, and how employers should operate their
employment practices to remain compliant under the conflicting state and
federal laws. Despite the clarification issues, Barbuto is a groundbreaking
decision as it provides qualified handicap employees with the right to
effectively medicate without fear of retribution. Finally and perhaps most
importantly, this decision will motivate employers with strict medical
marijuana employment policies to consider revising their policies to become
compliant with the Barbuto decision, as it is likely that this decision will
have a lasting impact on future employment practices for many years to
come.
Molly Carroll

